Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

State of Utah v. Kelvin Taylor : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Shelden R. Carter; Attorney for Appellant;
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Taylor, No. 15674 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1131

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CASE No.

KELVIN TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Fourth District Court of Utah County
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge

SHELDEN R CARTER
Utah county Legal Defender Assoc.
107 East 100 south # 29
Provo, UT 84601
Attorney for Appellant
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Utah State Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorney for Respondent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE ...•.•.........•.•...•. 1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT •..•••.•.•..•..•..••••..••.• 1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ••••••..••••..•.....•.•..•••....••. 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS •..•.•.....•..........•.•.•.•.•.•••...•• 2-7

ARGUMENT

POINT I:

THE DEFENDANT'S r10TIONS FOR MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES OR CIVIL
WRONGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED
FROM THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION ....... ?-12

CONCLUSION . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13

(i)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED:

Eubanks Vo State, (Alaska 1973) 516 P. 2d 726.0 .. 0 ...... 12
People Vo Velarde, (Colo. Appo 1975) 541 Po 2d 107 ...... 10,11
State Vo Ahrens, 25 U 222, 479 P 2d 786 (1971) .....•... 10
State Vo Baran, 25 u 2d 16, 474 Po 2d 728 (1970) ....... 10
State Vo Dixon, 12 U 2d 8, 361 P 2d 412 (1961) ......... 9
State Vo Hartman, 101 U 298, 119 P 2d 112 (1941) ....... 9
State Vo Huggins, 18 u 2d 219, 418 P 2d 978 (1966) ..•.. 9
State Vo Kasai, 27 U 2d 326, 495 P. 2d 1265 (1975) ..... 10
State v. Kazda, 14 U 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407 (1963) ...... 8
State v. Mason, U 530 P 2d 795 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
State v. Schieving, U 535 P. 2d 1232 (1975) ..•...••....
Van Gorham Vo State,
475 P. 2d 187 (Ok1a Cr. 1970) .... 11

( ii)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

~

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C A S E

N 0 .

KELVIN TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NA'l'URE OF THE CASE

-

This is an appeal from the judgment of a guilty verdict
entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah
County, State of Utah, for the crime of Theft, a second degree
felony.
DISPOSITION IN '!'HE LOWER COURT
Defendant was convicted on the 11th day of January, 1978
on theft of a firearm in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-404 and u.c.A.
§76-6-412.
to fifteen

-

Defendant was sentenced to a term of one (1) year
(15) years in the Utah State Prison.

The matter at

trial was heard before a jury.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction, or failing
that, a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was charged with exercising unauthorized
control over a firear!; belonging to John Myers in violation

'

of u.c.A. § 76-6-404 and"'§ 76-6-412.

The date of the charged

violation was September 9, 1977.
The State called l-1ark Myers; John F. Myers; John
Perrero; and Utah County Sheriff Deputy Frank Wall.

Defendant

called Lamar Langdon, police officer from Spanish Fork City,
State of Utah; Kenneth Lynn Mower; and the defendant, Kelvin
Taylor.
Mark Myers stated that he was acquainted with the defend ant, Kelvin Taylor.

He also stated how he had met the defer.·

dant.
"DIRECT EXAMINATION"

BY MR. WEIGIIT

Q

Would you please state your name?

A

Mark Myers.

Q

Where are you presently staying, rtr. Myers?

A

Utah State Penitentiary, B-Block 207.

Q

Are you acquainted with Kelvin Taylor?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

When did you first meet him?

A

I met him at a 90-day diagnostic unit, Utah State Penitenti~·

Q

D::> you remenber when that was?

A

It was the first part of March.
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Il
I

MR. CARI'ER:

Your Honor, may I object?

THE CUJRT:

Just a minute.

MR. CARI'ER:

I'd at this tine object and

reaffirm my notion for objection on the basis of my forner
notion.
THE <XlURI':

so show.

The record may

You have a standing objection, arrl your objection

is overruled.
(By Mr. \'Eight)

Q

Yes, you may.

You may proceed.
By date do you know approximately the day

or nonth when you met Mr. Taylor?
I don't know the exact date, but I went out to 90-Day diag-

A

nostic unit.
Okay.

Q

Were you in the Halfway House about the 6th day of

September last year?
Yes, that's the day I left from the Halfway House."

A

This line of questioning was only preceded by the
prosecutor's opening statement by Mr. Weight:
"This case involves the theft of a rifle, the rifle was
a 30-06.

It occurred on the 9th day of September, 1977.

Prior to

that time the defendant was an ao:ruaintance of a Mark Myers.
Myers is presently in the Utah State Prison.

Mark

At the tine of September

6th and prior to that time he was in the Halfway House on a rehabilitative program from the prison, and he was aiven opportunities through
(3)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Halfway House to have privileges to leave the facility and \\Ork
and his restraint was not quite as great as it 1.10uld be as if he

at the prison itself.

were

On the 6th day of September or al:xmt that day

Mr. Myers, wh::> knew the defendant because they had been together in

that halfway house facility at a time prior and had met there, left
the Halfway House and did not return as he was suppossed to do."
Based upon such statements by the prosecutor, defense
counsel moved for a mistrial.

(T. page 7-8)

Mark Myers further testified:
Q

A

"Now what do you mean your plans changed when you met girls?

Well, \>hen I went da.vn to pick

uo Kelvin to go up

and do sare

hunting, he had t\10 girls and one guy that ran away from North Dakota,
and I ccrrpletely changed plans fran going

Uf)

hunting.

I took the

people that slept outside and took them up to my house in Fannington

and fed them, gave them a nice hot shc:Mer, and then we -- then I qot
in trouble with the Halfway House and that's when we decided to run."
Again, Mr. Myers commented about certain runaways:
(T.

A

13)

"Yes.

I gave the runaways a hot meal and a hot shower arrl a

decent bed to sleep in."
Mr. Myers then testified as to the defendant stealinc
gas for Mr. Myer' s car.
A

(T. 15)

"The next day we went downtown, and we were running prettY lOI~
on gas, so Kelvin

the defendant went out and siphoned gas

for us and put it in my car, ancJ that qot us around."
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Mr. Myers then testified as to a theft of a citizen
band radio and a 2,000 watt candle power spot light.

(T.l8)

Q

After you discovered that tre rifle was missing
did you contact the defendant?
'

A

No, not when I found out the rifle was missing.
The first thing I did, I went to Springville to
the particular pawn shop.

Q

Why did you do that?

A

Because when I first discovered the c.b. was missing,
Kelvin Taylor told me that he left, he hal a flat
tire in Santaquin Canyon, and he left my car and
went to town to get a new tire for it, and he said
when he got back the c.b. was stolen.

Q

Okay.

A

I went to the Tip 'Ibp because I wasn't very sure to
myself that it was stolen, and because I knew it was
a pawn shop, because I ran low on rroney, and I hal a
fuzz roster and a 100 watt -- llO watt leaner for my
c.b. that I owned myself and paid for. I took it in
there and pawned it off myself, and then went out and
put gas in my car, then we tcok Holly and Kelvin over
to Provo and got sonething to eat. And then when I
went down there this time I asked the lady --

Q

let me stop you right there.
what time are you --

A

I'm talking al:xmt the time I found out the c.b. was
missing.

Q

Okay, go ahead.

A

I walked in there, and there was a lady behirrl the
counter, and I says, "Do you mind i f I look in your
stockroom and see if my stolen material is in here?"
And she first refused. And I says, "Well, look, I'll
put my hands in the air. I ~m' t touch nothing. I
just want to know to myself if it: s in here: " Then
she finally agreed, and I walked m there w:th my
harris in the air, and I looked over to my nght and
my dad's 06 was laying there and my c.b. and my
2,000 candle watt power spot light was there, and I
looked at the ticket and it said "Kelvin Taylor". By
that time I was so mad I oculdn' t even talk· "

Why did you go to tre Tip 'Ibp?

When you say "this time",
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Detective Sargeant Frank Wall, Utah County Sheriff's
Department, later took the stand and testified.

Mr. Wall

testified as to the defendant being on probation and other
charges being investigated.

(T. 48-49)

A

"Yes. I asked him, I said, "Kelvin, you realize
that this w::mld violate you, being in possession
and doing this with the firearm?" And re said
"Yes". I asked him i f his probation officer had
been notified, and he said, "No." So at that time
we called his probation officer and talked with him.

Q

Was that the substance of the conversation specifically about the rifle?

A

Well, he agreed to, you know, if we could help him
out in any way on any of the charges that re would
provide us with sane information as to the whereabouts of Mark Myers, the runaway from the Halfway
House."

Officer Wall then testified as to the defendant being
on parole and why he would want to violate his parole. (T.49)
A

"We had talked about his being involved in the situation and I asked Mr. Taylor why he would want to violate
his parole and take the chance again, and re indicated
that Mr. Myers asked him to go down and sell trese
things to get food and that was the reason why he had
sold these items."

Officer Wall then elaborated on the defendant being in
prison and the possibility of going back to prison.

(T.SO)

" ••• And as we were heading into the jail itself he "
said, "Well, I guess this will put rre back in pnson.
And I said, "Well, it looks like it. You probably should
have thought about it a little more before you got
involved with Mr. Myers" ...
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Officer Wall then testified as to his involvement
with the defendant on previous occassion.

(T. 50-51)

" ••• And I asked Kelvin, I felt pretty bad
because I had helped him out in previous and
I felt that he hadn't been honest to me ••• "

The State rested and the defendant Kelvin Taylor,
through his counsel, moved for a mistrial on the basis of
the prejudicial information above mentioned.

(T. 56)

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES
OR CIVIL WRONGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM
THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION.

1,

I'

i

The prosecuting attorney in his opening statement commented that the defendant had been in the Halfway House with
one Mark Myers.

Mr. Myers, upon questioning of the prosecuting

attorney, stated that he had met the defendant at a 90-day
Diagnositc Unit, Utah State Penitentiary.
The prosecutor even elicited the time that the defendant
was in the Penitentiary, the first part of March.

(T.l0-11)

Mr. Myers again prejudiced the defendant by implicating
the defendant with assisting and associating with runaways
from North Dakota.

(T.l2)

dant had stolen some gas.

Mr. Myers related how the defen(T.l5)

Thereafter, Mr. Myers re-
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lated how the defendant had also stolen a citizen band
radio and a spot light.
The prosecutor called Officer Frank Wall and elicit~
from that Officer that the defendant was on probation. (T.48):
that the defendant was on parole (T.49); that the defendant
had been in prison and would probably go back to prison (T.S~I
and that the defendant had been involved in other incidents
involving violations of the law.

(T. 50)

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55 provides:
"Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person rommitted a cri.Ire
or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to
prove his disposition to canmit =ime or civil wrong as the
basis for an inference that he cCllmlitted anotl:Er crime or
civil wrong on anotl:Er specified occasion but, subject to
Rule 45 and 48, such evidence is admissible when relevant
to prove some other material fact including absence of
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity."
In State v. Kazda, 14 u. 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407 (19631
the defendant there was convicted of assault with intent to
commit robbery and murder.

The State called an FBI agent

that had interviewed the defendant after the defendant h~
been arrested and incarcerated in Medford, Oregon.

The

agent stated that the defendant h ad informed him that he \vas
with two other men when they had shot and killed the victim.

!

The prosecutor further elicited from the agent that the defe·,
dant was incriminated in other crimes, including murder
( 8)
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occuring in other states, which the defendant denied to
the agent.

Further, that the defendant admitted being

arrested for a robbery in Nebraska and that there were
two outstanding warrants for the defendant's arrest in
Nebraska.
The Court reversed the verdict and stated:
"We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial error.
It implied that the defendant was implicated in other
crimes, none of them proven, and could have no other
effect than to degrade the defendant and give the jury
the impression that he had a propensity for crime."

Also, State v. Dixon, 12 U. 2d B, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961)
where the defendant, on trial for robbery, was questioned
concerning a criminal incident in which the defendant had
been involved but not convicted.

The Court found the inci-

dent to be immaterial to the matter before the Court.
In State v. Hartman, 101 U. 298, 119 P. 2d 112 (1941),
the Court states that an attempt to get into evidence the
prejudicial reference to another crime, such attempt might
well be grounds for a mistrial not only on the grounds of
prejudice, but as a proper expression of the Court's strong
disapproval for such tactics.
In State v. Huggins, 18 U. 2d 219, 418 P. 2d 978 (1966)
the State introduced in a prosecution for molesting two girls,
evidence of another act by the defendant suppossedly that same
day with a ten (10) year old girl.

There the Court was
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shocked and stated that such evidence:
" ... offends fair play and raises constitutional
questions."
Evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs should not
be brought into evidence for the purpose of disgracing

t~

defendant nor for the purpose of showing a propensity to
commit the crime charged.
530 P 2d 795;
1232;

State v. Mason,

State v. Schieving,

State v. Kasai,

State v. Baran, 25 U.
State v. Ahrens,

27 u.

(Utah 1975) 535 P. 2d

2d 326, 495 P. 2d 1265 (1975);

2d 16, 474 P.

25 U.

2d 728

2d 222, 479 P.

In People v. Velarde,

(Utah 1975)

(1970);

2d 786

and

(1971).

(Colo. App. 1975)

541 P. 2d 107,

the Colorado Court of Appeals found evidence that the defen-

There, the~~~.

dant had been in prison, required reversal.

dant, in a third degree felony burglary case, appeared as
his own witness.

His defense attorney inquired whether the

defendant had been convicted of any felonies.
stated that he had.

The defendant i

Upon cross-examination, the prosecutina

attorney inquired as to two other felonies in 1957 and 1967
The defendant stated that he had not been convicted.

lin 19:·)

the defendant had been convicted of a juvenile offense.

In

1967, the defendant had been convicted but such convictior.
was reversed with the case bein<J retried.)

Yet,

the prosec-

tor asked the defendant about his incarceration in prison.
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In that case, the court found:
11

It is elementary that in a criminal trial to a
j~, ~vidence of defendant's criminal activity,
which ~s unrelated to the offense charged, is in-

admissible when reference is !1\3.de in the presence
of the jury to such criminal activity, a mistrial
is norll\3.lly required ... 11
The Court further declared that the question regarding
the defendant being incarcerated in prison to be especially
objectionable.

Similar to Officer l>qall' s testimony in the

present case, a police officer in Velarde,

(supra) testified

that when he heard about the theft that he immediately ''thought
of the Valarde brothers. 11

The Court stated that such testimony

was prejudicial and should have been stricken.
Another case analagous to the present case is Van Gorham
v. State,

(Okla Cr. 1970) 475 P. 2d 187.

In Van Gorham, the

State called a police officer who was cross-examined as to an
alleged confession by the defendant regarding an Oklahoma
crime.

The officer interjected in the answer that the defen-

dant had stated that:

" ... he was on parole fran Kansas. 11

Further,

the prosecuting attorney questioned the defendant's Father as
follows:
Q

"At that time was he (defendant) on parole from
Kansas?"

The prosecutor asked the defendant's Mother the following:
Q

"All right, has he ever given you any trouble
in the past?

I\

He has been in some trouble in the past, yes sir.
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Q

What kind of trouble?

A

It was some trouble in Y-ansas.

Q

Well, in Kansas.

A

It was stealing some household goods out of a house.

Q

Was he convicted of that crime?

A

Yes, sir, he was.

Q

Was he sentenced by the Court?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Do you know what that sentence was?

A

One to ten years, I believe, arrl suspended. "

Alright, what kind of trouble?

The testimony was elicited from the witness before the
defendant took the stand and the Court found such testimony
was clearly inadmissible and could serve no purpose at that
time, but to prejudice the defendant.

To admit the testi-

mony of prior conviction before the defendant takes the su~
in a two stage proceeding was
See also Eubanks v. State,

" ... error of the worst kirxl."
(Alaska 1973) 516 P. 2d 726,

where the prosecution introduced evidence of heroin use in a
theft case.

The Court there found the prejudicial effect

c:

associating the defendant with heroin is great and reguir~
reversal.
CONCLUSION
Evidence that the defendant met Mr. Myers \vi thin the
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prison system was clearly of a prejudicial nature.

No

purpose can be contended that incarceration in a penal
institution is relevant to show absence of mistake or
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, or identity.

Such evidence does no more than

degrade the defendant and give the jury the impression that
he had a propensity to commit the crime.
Evidence that the defendant had been on probation and
parole is inadmissible in that it is not relevant to prove
a material fact.

Evidence that the defendant had siphoned

gasoline without permission ahs no relevancy to material
issues of the case; nor does the fact that he assisted runaways from North Dakota.
When culminated into a whole, the admission of the
evidence relating to incarceration in prison, parole, probation, theft, and assisting runaways, does such a prejudicial
damage to the defendant, it requires a mistrial, or at the
minimum an exclusion of that evidence.
DATED this

lf:S)IL

day of May, 1978.

~~

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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